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INTRODUCTION
he question of whether investor-state arbitration is bro-
ken, which this author posed in a 2012 article,
1
is being
increasingly answered with a resounding “yes,” and no longer
just by a few countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the
traditional victims of claims that contracting states under in-
vestment treaties never imagined possible when they signed up
for investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms.
2
In
1. George Kahale, III, Is Investor-State Arbitration Broken?, 9 TRANSNAT’L
DISP. MGMT. 1, 8 (Dec. 2012).
2. For commentary on the care (or lack thereof) taken by states in entering
into bilateral investment treaties (BITs), see JONATHAN BONNITCHA, LAUGE N.
SKOVGAARD POULSEN & MICHAEL WAIBEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 222 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2017) (“Political symbol-
ism and transnational mimicry were the main drivers of many investment
treaties rather than instrumental considerations relating to the legal content
and the practical implications of the treaties.”); Alison Ross, Former Pakistan
AG Opens Up About Investment Treaties, GLOBALARB. REV. (Jan. 17, 2011) (re-
porting on the observations of the former Attorney General of Pakistan about
his country’s experience with BITs, admitting that BITs were signed “without
any negotiation or consideration of the consequences,” that most of the treaties
were signed because a dignitary was visiting a foreign country or vice versa
and the two governments “couldn’t think of any other document to sign,” and
that a BIT “provides a good photo opportunity”); Department of Trade and In-
dustry, Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review, in 529 GOV’T
GAZETTE 5 (July 7, 2009) (S. Afr.) (“[T]he Executive entered into agreements
that were heavily stacked in favour of investors without the necessary safe-
guards to preserve flexibility in a number of critical policy areas. In reviewing
the travaux préparatoires of the various BITs entered into at the time, it be-
came apparent that the inexperience of negotiators at that time and the lack
of knowledge about investment law in general resulted in agreements that
were not in the long term interest of the RSA.”); Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen,
Sacrificing Sovereignty by Chance: Investment Treaties, Developing Countries,
and Bounded Rationality, LONDONSCH. ECON. & POL. SCI. 1, 3 (June 2011) (“By
overestimating the benefits of BITs and ignoring the risks, developing country
governments often saw the treaties as merely ¶tokens of goodwill.’ Many
thereby sacrificed their sovereignty more by chance than by design, and it was
typically not until they were hit by their first claim, officials realised that the
treaties were enforceable in both principle and fact.”).
T
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recent years, India,
3
Indonesia,
4
South Africa,
5
Bolivia,
6
Ecua-
dor
7
and Venezuela
8
have all taken steps to terminate invest-
ment treaties, some more radical than others, but all the result
of frustration with treaties that did not fulfill the promise of
3. Alison Ross, India’s Termination of BITs to Begin, GLOBALARB. REV. 155
(Mar. 22, 2017) (“As its self-imposed 31 March deadline for terminating bilat-
eral investment treaties draws near, India has sent notices of termination to
58 countries that are expected to take effect from as early as next month. . . .
In relation to its remaining 25 BITs, which have not completed their initial
term and therefore cannot be terminated, India has circulated a proposed joint
interpretative statement to the counterparty states, seeking to align their in-
terpretation as far as possible with the Model BIT.”).
4. Ben Bland & Shawn Donnan, Indonesia to Terminate More Than 60 Bi-
lateral Investment Treaties, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014).
5. Jackwell Feris, Challenging the Status Quo ³ South Africa’s Termina-
tion of Its Bilateral Trade Agreements, DLA PIPER INT’L ARB. NEWSL. (Dec. 10,
2014) (“The decision was prompted by a policy review of the actual value of
BITs for FDI flow to South Africa and also the risk that certain policy and
domestic interventionist measures may be open to attack by foreign investors
(including black economic empowerment and procurement policies).”).
6. Aldo Orellana López, Bolivia Denounces Its Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties and Attempts to Put an End to the Power of Corporations to Sue the Country
in International Tribunals, NETWORK JUST. GLOBAL INV. (June 2014), http://jus-
tinvestment.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Bolivia-denounces-its-Bilateral-
Investment-Treaties-and-attempts-to-put-an-end-to-the-Power-of-Corpora-
tions-to-sue-the-country-in-International-Tribunals.pdf (“The Bechtel case
sparked a growing awareness among Bolivians that finally led to a Constitu-
tional mandate to dismantle the system.”); Bolivia Inicia Retiro del Banco
Mundial, EXPANSIÓN (May 3, 2007).
7. Tom Jones, Ecuador Set to Terminate BITs, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (May 4,
2017) (“Ecuador’s approach is similar to that of India ² which recently an-
nounced a termination of its 58 remaining BITs to be replaced with treaties
based on a new Indian Model BIT drawn up in 2015 that reflects lessons
learned from the state’s past experience of investment disputes.”); Ecuador to
Pull Out of ICSID, GLOBALARB. REV. (June 15, 2009) (“The country’s Congress
voted to denounce the World Bank arbitration facility on 12 June, after Presi-
dent Rafael Correa said it signifies ¶colonialism, slavery with respect to trans-
nationals, with respect to Washington, with respect to the World Bank and we
cannot tolerate this.’”).
8. Venezuela terminated its treaty with the Netherlands following the fil-
ing of claims by ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips subsidiaries that incorporated
in the Netherlands long after the investments were made in Venezuela. Vene-
zuela Holdings, B.V. et al. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/27; ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V.
and ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30. In 2012, Venezuela withdrew from ICSID. Chris-
topher Toothaker, Venezuela Leaving World Bank’s Arbitration Body, SAN
DIEGOUNION-TRIB. (Jan. 25, 2012).
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increased foreign investment and seemed to bring nothing but
headache and the risk of catastrophic awards. Now the dissatis-
faction with investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms
seems to run as deep, if not deeper, in the heart of Europe.
9
The rise of anti-ISDS sentiment in Europe is hardly surpris-
ing, but it is not exclusively attributable to altruism. Rather, it
is best described as a long overdue acknowledgment of the fail-
ings of a system that was designed to protect U.S. and European
enterprises doing business in developing nations but had sud-
denly turned against the designers. In the last few years, scores
of arbitrations under investment treaties have been instituted
by investors against Western European countries that used to
be and still are the traditional homes of investors bringing
claims against countries in Asia, Africa or Latin America. Now
the European countries are under fire and, ironically, the fire is
coming from investors in Europe, a development that has Euro-
peans up in arms, especially when the investors meet with some
success. The moral of the story is that it is one thing to defend
and even promote a flawed system when you are the beneficiary,
quite another to do so when you are the victim.
10
The European backlash against investor-state arbitration has
not yet extended across the Atlantic to the United States, but
that is fortuitous. After all, the United States does not like sub-
jecting itself to the jurisdiction of international tribunals in any
field, much less ad hoc arbitral tribunals sitting in judgment on
legislative or other sovereign action in conference centers and
hotels around the world. If Congress has misgivings about the
United Nations, an international organization at least most
Americans have heard of, what can be expected when someday
some unknown arbitral tribunal slaps the United States with a
9. See European Commission, Concept Paper: Investment in TTIP and Be-
yond ³ the Path for Reform (May 5, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/do-
clib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF; European Commission, Trade for All:
Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy (Oct. 2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf; Euro-
pean Commission, Recommendation for a Council Decision Authorising the
Opening of Negotiations for a Convention Establishing a Multilateral Court for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes, COM (2017) 493 final (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52017PC0493&from=EN.
10. Not all states are up in arms over ISDS, but the trend is clear. Most
acknowledge that the system is in need of reform, and the number of states
looking for a complete overhaul or dismantling of the system is on the rise.
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multibillion-dollar award because it thinks a foreign claimant’s
treaty rights have been violated? The reaction is not likely to be
pretty.
But for now, ISDS flies largely under the radar in the United
States. Unlike in Europe, where ISDS has become a hot topic
both in the print media and on television,
11
in the United States,
there is little public discussion of ISDS outside of the interna-
tional arbitration community and, with few exceptions, the dis-
cussion that takes place there does not reflect a system in decline
or in need of a major overhaul. On the contrary, conferences on
ISDS tend to be a cross between ISDS rallies and an exploration
of means to make it more investor-friendly, with panels of speak-
ers packed with lawyers representing claimants and experts reg-
ularly appearing on their behalf.
11. See Envoyé Spécial, Multinationale Contre Etat: La Loi du Plus Fort
(France 2), YOUTUBE (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fLFOeJa8p8w; FrankMulder, Eva Schram
& Adriana Homolova, Big Davids, Small Goliaths, NEW INTERNATIONALIST
(June 1, 2016); The Arbitration Game: Governments Are Souring on Treaties to
Protect Foreign Investors, ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014) (“If you wanted to con-
vince the public that international trade agreements are a way to let multina-
tional companies get rich at the expense of ordinary people, this is what you
would do: give foreign firms a special right to apply to a secretive tribunal of
highly paid corporate lawyers for compensation whenever a government passes
a law to, say, discourage smoking, protect the environment or prevent a nu-
clear catastrophe. Yet that is precisely what thousands of trade and invest-
ment treaties over the past half century have done, through a process known
as ¶investor-state dispute settlement,’ or ISDS.”); PIA EBERHARDT & CECILIA
OLIVET, PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: HOW LAW FIRMS, ARBITRATORS AND
FINANCIERSAREFUELLING AN INVESTMENTARBITRATIONBOOM 71 (Helen Burley
ed., 2012), available at https://www.tni.org/files/download/profitingfrominjus-
tice.pdf (“As this report shows, investment lawyers have . . . promoted the use
of vague language in treaty clauses which increases the scope for investor-
friendly interpretation by arbitrators and the chances of disputes[;] tended to
approach investment law from an almost exclusively commercial angle rather
than public interest, ignoring or even denouncing arguments based on human
rights and sustainable development . . . worked alongside speculative invest-
ment funds to provide the finance for corporations to bring more cases, at the
expense of states and taxpayers. These actions have not only confirmed the
pro-corporate bias of current investment agreements, they have tilted the re-
gime even further in the favour of large multinational corporations. The result
is a system driven by commercial interests rather than the delivery of justice.”).
For a different perspective on the preceding report, see Charles N. Brower &
Sadie Blanchard, What’s in a Meme? The Truth about Investor-State Arbitra-
tion: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 689 (2014).
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Nevertheless, even though there is no public outcry against
ISDS in the United States, the U.S. Government has expressed
wariness at the potential excesses of arbitral tribunals, as evi-
denced by the joint interpretation of the fair and equitable treat-
ment (FET) provisions of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) issued by the United States and its NAFTA part-
ners, Canada and Mexico,
12
and the evolving U.S. Model BIT,
13
which reflects concern over the expansive views of tribunals that
have taken advantage of amorphous concepts, such as FET, to
12. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain
Chapter 11 Provisions (July 31, 2001) (“1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the cus-
tomary international lawminimum standard of treatment of aliens as the min-
imum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of an-
other Party. 2. The concepts of ¶fair and equitable treatment’ and ¶full protec-
tion and security’ do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which
is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treat-
ment of aliens.”).
13. The U.S. Model BIT was amended in 2004 to remove any doubt that FET
was never intended to extend beyond the international lawminimum standard
of treatment. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2004 U.S.MODEL BIT, art. 5 (“2. For
greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treat-
ment to be afforded to covered investments. The concepts of ¶fair and equitable
treatment’ and ¶full protection and security’ do not require treatment in addi-
tion to or beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not create
additional substantive rights.”). In warning against such expansive interpre-
tations of European treaties, the international trade committee of the Euro-
pean Parliament cited the North American experience: “The USA and Canada,
which were among the first states to suffer as a result of excessively vague
wording in the NAFTA agreement, have adapted their BIT model in order to
restrict the breadth of interpretation by the judiciary and ensure better pro-
tection of their public intervention domain. The EU should therefore include
in all its future agreements a specific clause laying down the right of the EU
and [Member States] to regulate. . . . Moreover, standards of protection should
be strictly defined, in order to avoid abusive interpretations by international
investors. In particular. . . fair and equitable treatment must be defined on the
basis of the level of treatment established by international customary law. . . .”
European Parliament, Committee on International Trade, Report on the Fu-
ture European International Investment Policy (2010/2203(INI)), at 11²12, Re-
port No. A7-0070/2011 (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.europarl.eu-
ropa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2011-
0070+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. The Canadian Model BIT is to the same effect.
Government of Canada, 2004 Canada Model Foreign Investment Promotion
and Protection Agreement, art. 5, ¶ 2 (“The concepts of ¶fair and equitable
treatment’ and ¶full protection and security’ in paragraph 1 do not require
treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.”).
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extend the scope of investor protection far beyond anything con-
templated by contracting states in entering into their treaties.
14
But the key fact is that, despite at least one close call,
15
the
United States has not yet experienced a significant setback at
the hands of an investor in a treaty claim, and it is hard to get
too worked up about excesses of the system when you always
win.
16
That does not mean that the United States is immune, alt-
hough one suspects that it does enjoy certain reputational ad-
vantages in ISDS, similar to the impact of star power on a jury.
One can easily imagine a day when a massive claim, such as the
since-withdrawn 15 billion USD Keystone Pipeline NAFTA
claim filed in 2016,
17
will be brought before just the right tribu-
nal to render one of the new-era mega-awards against the
United States. That is when the United States, at least if an
14. Andrea Giardina (Rapporteur), Legal Aspects of Recourse to Arbitration
by an Investor Against the Authorities of the Host State under Inter-State Trea-
ties, INSTITUT DEDROIT INT’L 5²6 (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.idi-iil.org/app/up-
loads/2017/06/Question3_Giardina.pdf (“The second fundamental evolution is
represented by the fact that starting from the middle of the 2010s, some im-
portant capital-exporting States, as the US and Canada, have begun to be re-
spondents in investment arbitration. This has probably been the reason of
some changes in the Model BITs adopted by these States, where better consid-
eration is provided for certain public interests of the States.”).
15. See The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States
of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (June 26, 2003); Chris
Hamby, A Homegrown Disaster, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 1, 2016),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/chrishamby/homegrown-disaster.
16. The official website of the U.S. Trade Representative proudly proclaims:
“Though the U.S. government regularly loses cases in domestic court, we have
never once lost an ISDS case and, in a number of instances, panels have
awarded the United States attorneys’ fees after the United States successfully
defended frivolous or otherwise non-meritorious claims.” Fact Sheet: Investor-
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/in-
vestor-state-dispute-settlement-isds (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
17. TransCanada Corporation and TransCanada PipeLines Limited v.
United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/21; Ethan Lou, TransCan-
ada Formally Seeks NAFTA Damages in Keystone XL Rejection, REUTERS (June
25, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-transcanada-keystone/transcan-
ada-formally-seeks-nafta-damages-in-keystone-xl-rejection-
idUSKCN0ZB0R9. The case was discontinued in March of 2017 after the U.S.
Government approved the project. Ethan Lou, TransCanada Keystone XL Re-
jection Lawsuit Dropped: Arbitrator, REUTERS (Mar. 24, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pipeline-keystone-lawsuit/transcan-
ada-keystone-xl-rejection-lawsuit-dropped-arbitrator-idUSKBN16V21G.
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America Firster is still in the White House and the Republicans
are still in control of Congress, is likely to join the anti-ISDS fray
and pave the way for the dismantling of the system.
18
In the meantime, it cannot be denied that there has been a sea
change in the attitude of states toward the system they created
in the naïve belief that they were promoting economic develop-
ment. Years ago, complaints about ISDS fell on deaf ears, even
at conferences organized for that purpose. The typical response
of states was to brush aside the criticism and defend their trea-
ties as either shining examples of the rule of law or, at worst,
necessary evils in the pursuit of the greater good. Today, a con-
ference of state representatives responsible for the defense of in-
vestment claims would be largely a forum for venting frustration
over self-inflicted wounds and the perceived inability to extricate
themselves from long-term treaty commitments.
18. The Trump Administration has given signs that it may want to back
away from ISDS in the NAFTA renegotiation. See, e.g., Josh Wingrove & Eric
Martin, U.S. Proposes Gutting Nafta Legal-Dispute Tribunals, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-14/u-s-is-
said-to-propose-gutting-nafta-legal-dispute-tribunals (“For investor-state dis-
pute settlement, presently laid out in Nafta’s Chapter 11, the U.S. wants a
system where nations opt in, effectively allowing each country to decide if it
will take part. . . .”). See also Letter from 230 Law and Economics Professors,
to President Trump, 230 Law and Economics Professors Urge President Trump
to Remove Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) from NAFTA and Other
Pacts (October 25, 2017), available at https://www.citizen.org/sys-
tem/files/case_documents/isds-law-economics-professors-letter-oct-2017_2.pdf.
Canada has also expressed deep dissatisfaction with ISDS generally, taking
positions similar to the European Union. Robert Howse, Canada’s NAFTA Re-
negotiation Objectives-Including Reform of the Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment Process, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Aug. 14, 2017, 10:40 AM),
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2017/08/canadas-nafta-renegotia-
tion-objectives-including-reform-of-the-investor-state-dispute-settlement-
pro.html (noting that the remarks of Canada’s foreign minister on the renego-
tiation of NAFTA make it clear that the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA) is going to be the beginning point of Canada’s negotiating
position on most points, but questioning whether the investment court pro-
vided for in CETA to replace “discredited traditional investor-state arbitration”
may be workable in the NAFTA context given the resistance of the U.S. to the
idea of an investment court); Charles-Emmanuel Côté, An Experienced, Devel-
oped Democracy: Canada and Investor-State Arbitration (Paper No. 7), in CIGI
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION SERIES 1, 27 (July 2016), available at
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/isa_paper_series_no.7web.pdf (“A
certain ¶de-arbitralization’ and judicialization of [investor-state arbitration] is
noticeable in Canadian treaty practice.”).
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What explains this sea change? The easy answer is that the
number of states that have suffered substantial awards with lit-
tle or no apparent benefits from the treaties that were supposed
to deliver oodles of foreign investment has increased with each
passing year; that number never goes down. But this is not just
a case of sour grapes. The problem is not that states can and
often do lose investment arbitrations; it is that they lose them in
a system that lacks credibility.
The list of state gripes about ISDS is long, starting with the
fact that they are always the accused, a point that certainly
should not have caught them by surprise since that is the object
of the system.
19
Some of the gripes can be addressed by tweaking
the system. For example, states are generally at a disadvantage
from the beginning of a case, when they are often unprepared for
the first critical event, the appointment of an arbitrator. There
are even occasions where a state is not able to take the bureau-
cratic steps necessary for the appointment of counsel by the time
the tribunal is formed and the first pleading is due, meaning
that the state is playing catch-up from the start and running the
risk of making strategic mistakes at the outset that invariably
affect the course of the entire proceedings.
20
These disad-
vantages, which should not be underestimated, can be somewhat
offset by minor adjustments, such as relaxation of the time peri-
ods provided by institutional rules for the appointment of arbi-
trators and the filing of the first pleadings.
21
They are problems
19. As one professor/arbitrator has pointed out, “to criticize a BIT on the
ground that it only gives rights to investors is like criticizing a screwdriver for
only being useful for attaching screws.” Vaughan Lowe, Book Review of ´Com-
mentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties / edited by Chester Brown,µ
30 ICSID REV. ³ FOREIGN INV. L.J. 275, 276 (2015).
20. The bureaucratic steps often include obtaining the necessary budget to
finance the defense of the case, which can be a complicated legal and political
process. Many presume that all states have the financial wherewithal to mount
forceful defenses, but actual experience does not bear that out. In fact, states
are often at a severe disadvantage in defending themselves due to financial
constraints, particularly when faced with claims by major private enterprises
accustomed to large-scale litigation or third-party funders alleviating the fi-
nancial burden on claimants.
21. There are important differences among institutional arbitration rules
on the timing of appointment of the tribunal. The ICSID Rules of Procedure
for Arbitration Proceedings provide a considerably longer period for a state to
make its appointment before ICSID will intervene. International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID], RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS (2006), available at
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with at least partial solutions³not reasons for scrapping the
system entirely.
But there are other problems of a far more fundamental nature
that cannot be fixed through tweaking. The issue now is no
longer whether investor-state arbitration is broken; from the
standpoint of states having to defend against the ever-growing
number of investor claims, it certainly is. The new question is
whether it is so broken that it cannot be fixed without tearing it
down and starting over.
22
Let us take another look at some of the more troublesome as-
pects of ISDS and at why many states are now viewing invest-
ment treaties more as weapons of legal destruction than boons
for economic development.
I. WHO ISDEVELOPING THIS BODY OF LAW?
The fundamental problems with ISDS are all inter-related, but
the analysis starts with the arbitrators who are developing this
new body of law. There is no such thing as a perfect judiciary,
but most established and respected legal systems make more of
an effort than ISDS to approach that goal. ISDS is actually built
upon premises that impede rather than promote the objective of
a credible legal system. First among those premises is that the
interpretation and application of BIT provisions can be
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/documents/icsiddocs/icsid%20conven-
tion%20english.pdf [hereinafter ICSID Arbitration Rules]. By contrast, the
Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) require
a respondent, whether it be a state or a private party, to answer the request
for arbitration and appoint an arbitrator within thirty days. International
Chamber of Commerce, ARBITRATION RULES, art. 5 (2017), available at
https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/01/ICC-2017-Arbitration-
and-2014-Mediation-Rules-english-version.pdf [hereinafter ICC Rules]. The
answer does not have to be very detailed, and extensions are often granted, but
they are usually conditioned upon the respondent’s appointment of an arbitra-
tor within the thirty-day period, which is simply not practical for a state.
22. See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Improving Investment Dis-
pute Settlement: UNCTAD Policy Tools, in 4 IIA ISSUES NOTE: INT’L INV.
AGREEMENTS 6, 10 (2017) (noting concerns about ISDS that have been “well-
documented in academic and policy literature,” including lack of legitimacy,
transparency and consistency, erroneous decisions, concerns over arbitrators’
independence and impartiality, and the high cost of arbitrations, and present-
ing various options for reforming ISDS, including “abolishing the existing sys-
tem of ad hoc investor-State arbitration and replacing it with other mecha-
nisms for settling investment disputes”) [hereinafter Improving Investment
Dispute Settlement].
2018] Rethinking ISDS 21
entrusted to arbitrators appointed by the parties or by arbitral
institutions.
Most important international arbitrations are conducted by
tribunals consisting of three arbitrators, one appointed by each
side and the third, acting as president of the tribunal, appointed
either by an agreement of the party-appointed arbitrators, some-
times with the participation of the parties themselves, or by the
arbitral institution administering the process.
23
The debate as to
the wisdom of this practice has heated up in recent years, par-
ticularly with respect to the advantages and disadvantages of a
party’s right to appoint an arbitrator.
24
It is often said that par-
ticipants in international dispute resolution, both investor-state
and ordinary commercial arbitration, would be uncomfortable in
not having the ability to participate in the formation of the tri-
bunal and reluctant to surrender that right to an international
institution. The other side of the argument holds that the prac-
tice damages the credibility of the arbitral process due to the
perception that party-appointed arbitrators consciously or sub-
consciously feel an obligation to defend the position of the parties
appointing them, even though institutional arbitration rules es-
tablish the requirements of independence and impartiality for
23. See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States art. 37²40, 56, opened for signatureMar.
18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter
ICSID Convention]; ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 21, Rules 1²5, 7, 11;
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL],
ARBITRATION RULES, arts. 6²10, 14 (Feb. 2014), available at https://www.un-
citral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-2013/UNCITRAL-
Arbitration-Rules-2013-e.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules]; ICC Rules, su-
pra note 21, arts. 12²13, 15; Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber
of Commerce, ARBITRATION RULES, arts. 17, 21 (Jan. 1, 2017), available at
https://sccinstitute.com/media/293614/arbitration_rules_eng_17_web.pdf
[hereinafter SCC Rules]. Cf. London Court of International Arbitration,
ARBITRATION RULES, art. 5 (Oct. 1, 2014), available at http://www.lcia.org/dis-
pute_resolution_services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014.aspx (in which the default
rule is appointment of the tribunal by the LCIA Court).
24. See Jan Paulsson,Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, 25
ICSID REV. 339 (2010); Hans Smit, The Pernicious Institution of the Party-Ap-
pointed Arbitrator, 33 COLUM. FDI PERSP. (2010); Albert Jan van den Berg,
Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration,
in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W.
MICHAEL REISMAN 821 (M. Arsanjani et al. eds., Koninklijke Brill 2011);
Charles N. Brower & Charles B. Rosenberg, The Death of the Two-Headed
Nightingale: Why the Paulsson-van den Berg Presumption that Party-Ap-
pointed Arbitrators are Untrustworthy is Wrongheaded, 29 ARB. INT’L 7 (2013).
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all members of the tribunal, including the party-appointed arbi-
trators.
25
This side places too much faith in the arbitral institu-
tions that would make the appointments, faith that neither in-
vestors nor states have.
In commercial arbitration, the practice of party appointments
is not as serious an issue. In fact, one can readily understand
that the objectives of speed and finality override other consider-
ations in the process of resolving a commercial dispute. Compro-
mise among arbitrators does not have the same adverse conse-
quences in commercial arbitration as it does in investor-state ar-
bitration. The legal issues at stake are rarely of importance be-
yond the confines of the particular arbitration. Few, if any, of the
cases involve the public interest, and the overriding interest of
the private parties is often simply to reach a result that both
sides can live with and that could have been reached through a
vigorous process of negotiation or mediation. Under these cir-
cumstances, party participation in the formation of a tribunal
has few drawbacks and can even be seen as salutary.
The same is not true in investor-state arbitration, where issues
of public international law and national sovereignty are at stake.
The implications of a legal decision can and often do reach far
beyond the confines of the particular arbitration, and the public
interest is directly implicated. It is a mistake to superimpose
rules of tribunal formation (or other practices) that may be ac-
ceptable in the context of private, commercial arbitration onto
investor-state arbitration without undertaking a de novo analy-
sis of their suitability to the latter.
If one would be starting a system of investor-state dispute set-
tlement from scratch, it would be natural to give serious consid-
eration to the notion that arbitrators who would be called upon
to apply fundamental principles of public international law in
the context of claims exceeding the gross domestic product of
many countries should pass through a serious vetting system.
That is not the case today. Arbitrators are not subject to the
same scrutiny, for example, as federal judges in the United
States or as members of the International Court of Justice. Alt-
hough some standouts are superbly qualified to perform their
25. ICSID Convention, supra note 23, art. 14; UNCITRAL Rules, supra note
23, arts. 11²12; ICC Rules, supra note 21, art. 11; SCC Rules, supra note 23,
art. 18.
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tasks and have done so admirably, many others are not, have
not, and do not even see that as their primary responsibility.
26
Even more troubling is the fact that the method of appoint-
ment raises questions as to the ability of any arbitrator, no mat-
ter how pure his or her motives may be, to render truly objective
legal decisions. A national judge with a lifetime appointment
and a heavy caseload received by institutional assignment, ra-
ther than party appointment, does not lose sleep over the pro-
spect of losing business as a consequence of rendering the right
legal decision. By contrast, an arbitrator whose livelihood de-
pends upon party appointments may think twice before render-
ing a decision that might be upsetting not only to one of the par-
ties involved, but also to the myriad observers who compile lists
of arbitrator candidates for future cases. It should be borne in
mind that, unlike commercial arbitration, a large percentage of
investor-state awards find their way into the public domain and
are studied not only in law schools, but by potential litigants
looking for trends and arbitrator candidates for future cases.
They also do not escape the notice of third-party funders looking
to maximize the chances of financial gain on their speculative
investments. It takes a heavy dose of integrity and strong-mind-
edness, and perhaps a healthy balance sheet, to resist that temp-
tation. No legal system should have to rely upon that to produce
competent and unbiased tribunals.
The reality is that with few exceptions, usually state parties
before they gain the experience that comes with defending cases
in the system they created, litigants do their homework in decid-
ing whom to appoint as arbitrators.
27
The further unfortunate
26. There is no consensus in the investment arbitration community as to the
role of an arbitrator. Some view an arbitrator’s responsibility as limited to the
dispensing of justice according to the equities of the particular case; others see
a systemic dimension to their role and are more concerned with the impact of
their decisions on the development of the law. The former is more in line with
traditional concepts of arbitration in a private or commercial context, while the
latter is more in line with the concept of ISDS as a legal system. For states, the
more flexible approach is the more dangerous one, as flexibility leads to ever-
expanding interpretations of the scope of investor protection given the manner
in which tribunals are formed and the lack of sufficient legal infrastructure to
curb that expansion.
27. The exception of states before they experience the reality of investor-
state arbitration dynamics can be seen against the background of the manner
in which many states naïvely entered into investment treaties. See supra note
2. In the early period of investor-state arbitration, states had a tendency to
appoint arbitrators having a certain standing in the international arbitration
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reality is that the pool of candidates with a clear track record
favoring investors in investor-state arbitration is far wider and
deeper than the pool of candidates having sensitivity to the in-
terests of states.
There are numerous reasons for this state of affairs, including
the fact that many of the prominent players in investor-state ar-
bitration, both institutions and individuals, are grounded in pri-
vate commercial arbitration rather than in public international
law, but the overarching factor is the method of appointment of
tribunals. Investors are not looking to appoint arbitrators with
sensitivities for states’ concerns or even balanced views; nor are
they interested in arbitrators’ credentials as public international
lawyers. What they are looking for are arbitrators who will give
them the best chance of winning, and that means arbitrators
well-prepared to defend the positions that are favorable to them
(whether due to the arbitrator’s conception of the role of a party-
appointed arbitrator or to his or her legal philosophy) and, where
necessary, to break new ground in the field of investor protec-
tion. To complete the picture, all you need to do is remember that
there are only so many states in the world defending against in-
vestor claims, whereas the number of potential claimants is vir-
tually infinite.
Several statistical studies have been done on whether there
exists a bias against states in investor-state arbitration. Some
focus on the countries of origin of arbitrators, as if an arbitrator
from the United States, Canada or Western Europe would tend
to favor expansive views of investor protection and those from
Asia, Africa or Latin America would be more sympathetic to
states’ concerns. That kind of study is of limited utility in ana-
lyzing the issue of bias in the system, as there are abundant ex-
amples of arbitrators espousing exactly the opposite views as
what might be expected from such unwarranted generalizations.
While nationality can be a consideration in some cases, checking
passports is not what is meant by doing one’s homework in the
appointment process. The question of whether there is bias in
the system cannot be answered by counting the number of arbi-
trators coming from each country or region in the world.
community, without regard for the actual views they held as reflected in their
writings or prior decisions. The result was arbitrator appointments by states
that in some cases left reasonably informed observers scratching their heads
in disbelief. In more recent years, states have been increasingly doing their
homework before making appointments.
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Equally unconvincing are statistics showing the percentages
of cases won by states, however winning is defined. Those stud-
ies, frequently held up as clear refutation of charges of bias in
the system, are actually a refutation of nothing. The issue is not
whether states can ever win in investor-state arbitration. They
can and often do³even a majority of the time by some measures.
The question is whether the pool, or some say “club,” of arbitra-
tors includes a disproportionate number of members predis-
posed to stock investor positions. An affirmative answer to that
question cannot be avoided simply by pointing to a percentage of
cases won by states. A study showing, for example, that states
win as many cases as they lose does not mean that the system is
in perfect balance, and one showing that 70 percent of cases are
won by states is hardly impressive if most of the cases never
should have seen the light of day and if a large percentage of
them would not have seen the light of day were it not for the
speculation of third-party funders promoting litigation in the
hope that two of the three arbitrators on their tribunals have
strong pro-investor inclinations.
28
The fact is that there is a marked bias in the system against
states. This author has previously warned that there was a
growing perception of bias, and that the perception of bias was
as important as actual bias.
29
But actual experience, not statis-
tics, indicates that in this case perception and reality are one
and the same.
30
That is not to say that all arbitrators have a pro-
investor bias. Of course, that is not the case. But it is a fact that
28. See Howard Mann, ISDS: Who Wins More, Investors or States?, INV.
TREATY NEWS (June 2015) (analyzing UNCTAD statistics on wins and losses
and concluding: “The balance in the ISDS system cannot be measured by wins
and losses alone. The impacts of the current dominant approach to investment
treaties and ISDS go well beyond simply a tally of wins and losses. But with
these new numbers, at least it can no longer be said, simplistically, that the
system is balanced because states win more than investors³they clearly do
not when comparing the proper numbers.”).
29. George Kahale, III, A Problem in Investor/State Arbitration, 6
TRANSNAT’LDISP. MGMT. (Mar. 2009).
30. In some cases, bias manifests itself at a hearing, where a claimant-ap-
pointed arbitrator or, occasionally, even the president of a tribunal intervenes
for no apparent purpose other than to assist or rescue counsel. Most arbitra-
tors, however, make a conscious effort to refrain from such interventionism.
Some even go out of their way to exhibit sensitivity to the positions of both
sides. In the end, the important issue remains whether bias exists, an issue
that is not resolved exclusively by reference to an arbitrator’s conduct at a
hearing.
26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:1
states have far more difficulty finding acceptable candidates for
arbitrator appointments than those involved in the representa-
tion of claimants. It is also a fact that when arbitral institutions
are called upon to make the all-important selection of the presi-
dent of the tribunal, the state respondents hope that the selec-
tion will be of an arbitrator with some semblance of neutrality
and fear that it would be much worse.
31
This unsatisfactory situation has become downright danger-
ous with the advent of the megacase. In the early days of ISDS,
billion-dollar claims were pie in the sky. These days they are
commonplace.
32
Does that mean that states are committingmore
31. For an example of an academic study of bias, see Gus Van Harten, Ar-
bitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of In-
vestment Treaty Arbitration, 50 OSGOODEHALL L.J. 211 (2012) (“The study ex-
amines arbitrator behaviour in the unique context of investment treaty arbi-
tration. It employs the method of content analysis to test hypotheses of sys-
temic bias in the resolution of jurisdictional issues in investment treaty law.
Unlike earlier studies, the study examines trends in legal interpretation in-
stead of case outcomes and finds statistically significant evidence that arbitra-
tors favour: (1) the position of claimants over respondent states and (2) the
position of claimants from major Western capital-exporting states over claim-
ants from other states. There is a range of possible explanations for the results
and further inferences are required to connect the observed trends to ration-
ales for systemic bias. The key finding is that the observed trends exist and
that they are unlikely to be explained by chance. This gives tentative empirical
evidence of cause for concern about the use of arbitration in this context.”).
Such studies are worthwhile, but anyone with extensive experience in the de-
fense of investor claims would not need a formal study to draw the above con-
clusions.
32. The Yukos cases against Russia are an extreme example, with stagger-
ing claims of around US$114 billion and awards totaling in excess of $50 billion
USD, by far the largest in the history of arbitration. Hulley Enterprises Lim-
ited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 226,
Final Award (July 18, 2014); Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The
Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 227, Final Award (July 18,
2014); Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation,
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 228, Final Award (July 18, 2014). The Yukos
awards were set aside on jurisdictional grounds by a court in The Hague, a
decision now on appeal. The Russian Federation v. Veteran Petroleum Lim-
ited, Yukos Universal Limited and Hulley Enterprises Limited,
Case Nos. C/09/477160 / HA ZA 15-1, C/09/477162 / HA ZA 15-2 and
C/09/481619 / HA ZA 15-112, Judgment (The Hague District Court, Chamber
for Commercial Affairs 2016). While the Yukos awards are unique, there have
been many “smaller” claims that reach the billion-dollar level and even a few
other billion-dollar awards in recent years. See Matthew Hodgson & Alastair
Campbell, Damages and Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration Revisited,
GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Dec. 14, 2017).
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and more serious treaty violations causing greater and greater
damage, or does it mean that investors and their corps of testi-
fying experts have become more adept at manufacturing strato-
spheric damage claims out of thin air? Whatever the answer, the
point is that in this era of the megacase, there is no room for
mistakes, whether they be the product of bias or incompetence.
It is not enough to say that the system gets it right most of the
time. When so much is at stake, even a single mistake can be
catastrophic, and if anything is clear about ISDS, it is that seri-
ous mistakes are not hard to find.
II. THE STANDARDS FOR ARBITRATOR CHALLENGES
The second premise governing the formation of arbitral tribu-
nals is that the rigid rules of conflicts applicable in established
legal systems need not be applied in international arbitration.
This means that relationships most judges in a national legal
system would consider problematic are hardly given a second
thought in international arbitration. Like the issues discussed
above, this is not as serious a problem in commercial arbitration
as it is in ISDS. When the overriding objective is to arrive at a
reasonable commercial resolution of the dispute at hand, rather
than the correct application of legal principles in cases involving
the public interest, casual relationships and an inclination to de-
fend the appointing party’s position are not as troublesome.
Leaders of international arbitration institutions are aware of
this concern, but often feel at a loss to address it. There is a gen-
eral feeling that the rules governing arbitrator activities and re-
lationships should be more relaxed in international arbitration
because it is by definition a less formal and more flexible form of
dispute settlement than court procedures, and there is a dearth
of competent arbitrators to handle investor-state cases, meaning
that an application of rigid rules of conflicts would jeopardize the
functioning of the entire system. But formal or not, arbitrators
are dealing with matters at least as important and often far
more important than the routine matters brought before na-
tional courts, and it cannot be the case that there is insufficient
talent in the world for the formation of truly impartial and inde-
pendent tribunals. In any event, practical considerations are not
an excuse for relaxed standards that tarnish the credibility of
the system. If enough suitable and truly independent and im-
partial arbitrators cannot be found, the answer is to rethink the
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entire system³repeal and replace, to borrow an expression from
another field³not to defend it.
Strangely, it is often said that the standards for arbitrator
challenges in ICSID arbitration, which by definition is investor-
state arbitration, are even stricter than in commercial arbitra-
tion.
33
That appeared to be softened somewhat in the Blue Bank
case, in which the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Coun-
cil stressed the importance of the appearance of impartiality in
the mind of a reasonable third-party observer.
34
But those are
only words; they cannot be assessed in the abstract. The proof of
the pudding is in the actions and attitudes of the arbitrators,
who are the first enforcers of the standards, and in the decisions
on challenges. Those decisions evince a still high bar for arbitra-
tor challenges, although perhaps not as high as it once was.
It is useful to compare the practice in the U.S. federal judiciary
to international arbitration. On paper, the standards for recusal
appear similar, but not so in practice. For example, one of this
author’s former partners who became a federal district judge
would recuse himself from any case in which his former col-
leagues were to appear as counsel. He followed that rule for dec-
ades after taking up his position on the bench³a practice that
seems completely alien to international arbitration³because of
his concern that there might be a perception of partiality due to
the former relationship. Another example familiar to the inter-
national arbitration community was provided in the Yukos en-
forcement proceeding in Washington, D.C., where the judge
recused herself from the case because of the possibility that her
33. Under Article 57 of the ICSID Convention, a proposal for disqualifica-
tion should be based on a “manifest lack” of the qualities of independence and
impartiality required by Article 14 of the ICSID Convention. ICSID Conven-
tion, supra note 23, arts. 14, 57.
34. Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/20, Decision on the Parties’ Proposals to
Disqualify a Majority of the Tribunal, ¶¶ 59²60 (Nov. 12, 2013) (“Articles 57
and 14(1) of the ICSID Convention do not require proof of actual dependence
or bias; rather it is sufficient to establish the appearance of dependence or bias.
The applicable legal standard is an ¶objective standard based on a reasonable
evaluation of the evidence by a third party.’”) (emphasis in original). See
UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 23, art. 12, ¶ 1; DAVID D. CARON & LEE
M. CAPLAN, THEUNCITRALARBITRATIONRULES: A COMMENTARY 214 (2nd ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2013) (noting that sustaining a challenge “does not neces-
sarily require proof of an arbitrator’s actual lack of impartiality or independ-
ence. The appearance of these deficiencies may alone suffice in certain circum-
stances to disqualify an arbitrator”) (emphasis in original).
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contacts with one of the counsel might give rise to an appearance
of impropriety, the contacts being that the two had attended the
same bar association events and their children had attended the
same school.
35
Again, that strict approach is unheard of in inter-
national arbitration, where far more extensive contacts are rou-
tinely dismissed and often not even disclosed.
There are some arbitrators who, as a matter of policy, will
withdraw from a case or refuse to accept an appointment at the
slightest hint of dissatisfaction of a party with the arbitrator’s
impartiality or independence. Others do not. Why they do not is
a question only they can answer. There are surely some cases in
which withdrawal, even if convenient for the arbitrator, would
not be in the interests of justice and would be deleterious to the
proper functioning of the system. But in others, the nagging
question is whether the arbitrator fights a challenge because of
a desire to earn the remuneration that comes with the appoint-
ment. The busiest members of the “club” can earn substantial
sums in arbitrator fees, more than a judge in a national court
system and more than the remuneration of any national or in-
ternational civil servant, including members of the
35. The judge had disclosed the following:
I knew [counsel] professionally only through many years,
through many bar activities. We attended a lot of litigation
section meetings together, and those did include dinners and
receptions and social activities. And then in the late ¶90s and
early 2000s we had two sons who were in the same private
school kindergarten and elementary school class through
about fourth grade. We are not close personal friends. We
have not socialized, gone out to dinner, gone to each other’s
homes, although I believe I have been to her home, but only
in connection with bar-related activities or school activities.
She wrote a letter to the White House on my behalf, support-
ing my nomination to the bench when it was pending.
Transcript of Telephone Status Conference at 3, Hulley Enterprises Ltd. et al.
v. Russian Federation, No. 1:14-cv-01996-ABJ (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 2015); Alison
Ross, ´School Momµ Link Spurs Yukos Judge to Step Down, GLOBAL ARB. REV.
(Nov. 20, 2015); Petitioners’ Motion to Recuse or Disqualify the District Judge
and Petitioners’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Recuse or
Disqualify the District Judge, Hulley Enterprises Ltd. et al. v. Russian Feder-
ation, No. 1:14-cv-01996-ABJ (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2015). The standard the judge
applied in recusing herself was the following: “Any justice, judge, or magistrate
judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2018).
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International Court of Justice (for their activities on the Court,
not as arbitrators).
36
Those fees are not earned by resigning from
cases, and there is no guarantee that each case an arbitrator
gives up will be immediately replaced with a new appointment.
There are those who have reached a stage in their careers and
earned a reputation for integrity that makes their judgment on
such issues beyond reproach, but not all arbitrators fit neatly
into that category, and it is unwise to devise a system that as-
sumes that they do.
In ICSID cases, the procedure for deciding arbitrator chal-
lenges is seriously flawed. A proposal to disqualify an arbitrator
in an ICSID case is to be decided by the other two arbitrators,
37
an understandably unwelcome task. It is always unpleasant to
pass judgment on a colleague. The natural tendency of an arbi-
trator in that position would be to avoid controversy and reject
the challenge, or at most, pass the buck to ICSID.
38
In addition,
one again has to ask whether the possibility of reprisals can
cloud one’s judgment and overshadowwhat may be serious ques-
tions about the challenged arbitrator’s independence or impar-
tiality. That concern is heightened when the deciding arbitrators
are either members of the club or seeking entry.
There is one subject on which the disqualification rules and
practices of national jurisdictions are more liberal than those of
international arbitration: issue conflict. Actually, issue conflict
is a non-issue in national courts. The fact that it is a topic of
discussion in investor-state arbitration is not a compliment to
ISDS; it is a function of one of ISDS’s principal shortcomings,
the sovereignty of individual arbitral tribunals.
In a mature legal system, judges are not free to render deci-
sions on points of law in accordance with their personal views,
without regard to binding precedent. They may disregard prece-
dent, but at the risk of their reputations and reversal on appeal.
36. According to the ICJ website, “Each Member of the Court receives an
annual salary consisting of a base salary (which, for 2016, amounts to
US$172,978) and post adjustment, with a special supplementary allowance of
US$15,000 for the President. The post adjustment multiplier changes every
month and is dependent on the United Nations exchange rate between the
United States dollar and the euro.” Members of the Court, INT’L CT. JUST.,
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/members (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). Busy arbitra-
tors can earn fees many times that amount.
37. ICSID Convention, supra note 23, art. 58.
38. If the two arbitrators do not agree, the decision is to be made by the
Chairman of the Administrative Council. Id.
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A litigant appearing before a judge who has previously rendered
a decision on a key point of law and has been reversed on appeal
can take comfort in the knowledge that the judge cannot simply
disregard the appellate court’s ruling. In other words, the fun-
damental check on the power of individual judges provided by
the infrastructure of a developed legal system renders the con-
cept of issue conflict largely moot.
39
In investor-state arbitration,
where that check does not exist, issue conflict assumes greater
importance in the impartiality analysis.
40
Issue conflict becomes more relevant with each passing day
due to the fact that a relatively high percentage of investor-state
cases are decided by a relatively small number of arbitrators.
That level of concentration, coupled with the high degree of sim-
ilarity in treaty provisions, means that the chances of an arbi-
trator having prejudged a key issue are not insignificant. A
39. The recent cases regarding enforcement proceedings for ICSID awards
in U.S. federal courts provide a good example of how a mature legal system
functions. One federal district court in New York held that an action on an
ICSID award, unlike one to confirm an award under the New York Convention,
did not require the normal process of a civil action against a foreign state under
the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Mobil Cerro Negro Ltd. v. Bolivar-
ian Republic of Venezuela, 87 F. Supp. 3d 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). A federal court
in the District of Columbia held exactly the opposite. See Micula v. Gov’t. of
Romania, 104 F. Supp. 3d 42 (D.D.C. 2015). On appeal of the Mobil case, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, settling
the law on that issue for future cases in the Second Circuit. Mobil Cerro Negro
Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 863 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2017).
40. International Council for Commercial Arbitration [ICCA], Report of the
ASIL-ICCA Joint Task Force on Issue Conflicts in Investor-State Arbitration:
The ICCA Reports No. 3, ¶¶ 15, 159 (Mar. 17, 2016) (“While the notion of issue
conflict is not equivalent to impartiality, it rests on concerns about impartial-
ity. Does an arbitrator approach a significant disputed issue with the ability to
decide it based on the parties’ arguments in the case, and not on the basis of
some inappropriate predisposition or prejudgment? This aspect of issue conflict
is crucial for confidence in the integrity of investment arbitration and, ulti-
mately, for its legitimacy. . . . [T]he most fundamental question underlying
concerns about inappropriate predisposition remains how to distinguish be-
tween unobjectionable forms of predisposition and those triggering reasonable
concerns about bias. It may indeed be that allowing challenges alleging issue
conflict can chill useful publication or professional development, or dry up the
supply of arbitrators with necessary knowledge and experience, all to the det-
riment of the investment arbitration system. However, these values relate to
the welfare of the system; they operate in a different sphere from a party’s
right to have a claim decided by an impartial arbitrator. A party in a specific
case rightly cares about having her claim fairly decided by an unbiased arbi-
trator, not about the system’s future welfare.”).
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statistical analysis is not needed to appreciate that the chances
of an issue conflict arising are even greater when the tribunal
consists of highly experienced arbitrators with track records on
issues, such as whether the concept of FET extends beyond the
minimum standard of treatment under customary international
law, whether and to what extent the minimum standard of treat-
ment has evolved beyond the Neer standard,
41
whether and to
what extent a most favored nation (MFN) clause may be used to
import standards of treatment from other treaties,
42
and any
number of other critical issues that recur in investor-state cases.
Until relatively recently, the possibility of winning an arbitra-
tor challenge based on prior decisions, writings, or public state-
ments was considered remote at best. In Urbaser v. Argentina,
43
an arbitrator was challenged for issue conflict based on prior
writings, not decisions. The two remaining arbitrators³it was
an ICSID case³rejected the challenge, obviously sensitive to the
fact that the best-known and most experienced arbitrators are
likely to have expressed views on key issues on various occasions
and that disqualification for issue conflict would create an un-
warranted chilling effect and unduly disfavor experienced arbi-
trators to the benefit of the inexperienced who have not yet pro-
nounced themselves on anything. Importantly, the deciding ar-
bitrators did not reject outright the concept of issue conflict, but
decided against disqualification on the facts presented, includ-
ing the challenged arbitrator’s affirmation of his impartiality
and willingness to approach the issue with an open mind.
44
41. L.F.H. Neer and Pauline E. Neer v. Mexico, No. 136 (Mexico²U.S. Gen-
eral Claims Commission 1926), in 21 AM. J. INT’L L. 555, 556 (1927) (holding
that in order to violate the standard, the treatment of an alien “should amount
to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of
governmental action so far short of international standards that every reason-
able and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency”).
42. Simon Batifort & J. Benton Heath, The NewDebate on the Interpretation
of MFN Clauses in Investment Treaties: Putting the Brakes on Multilateraliza-
tion, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 873 (2018).
43. Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur
Partzuergoa v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Decision on
Claimant’s Proposal to Disqualify Arbitrator (Aug. 12, 2010).
44. Id. ¶ 44 (stating the test as whether the opinions expressed “are specific
and clear enough that a reasonable and informed third party would find that
the arbitrator will rely on such opinions without giving proper consideration to
the facts, circumstances, and arguments presented by the Parties in this pro-
ceeding”). See also ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework
for ICSID Arbitration, ¶ 17 (Oct. 22, 2004) (“With the large number of new
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It was a different story in Devas.
45
That case involved the in-
terpretation of the “essential security interests” provision of the
India-Mauritius BIT. One of the arbitrators had previously
chaired three separate tribunals holding that an essential secu-
rity interests provision simply mirrors the “state of necessity”
defense under customary international law.
46
A second arbitra-
tor had also sat on two of the three cases. All three awards were
the subject of annulment proceedings, two of which found that
the limitation of specific treaty provisions on essential security
interests to the state of necessity defense under customary in-
ternational law constituted manifest error.
47
The state chal-
lenged the two arbitrators on the ground of issue conflict. The
challenge was decided by the then President of the International
Court of Justice, acting in his capacity as appointing authority
under the BIT. One of the arbitrators was disqualified, as he had
cases, the disclosure requirements for ICSID arbitrators might usefully be ex-
panded. Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, an arbitrator is required to
disclose to the parties any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts
as to his or her impartiality or independence. The relevant ICSID provisions,
ICSID Arbitration Rule 6(2) and Article 13(2) of the Additional Facility Arbi-
tration Rules, could be amended similarly to require the arbitrator to disclose,
not only any past or present relationships with the parties, but more generally
any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s
reliability for independent judgment. This might in particular be helpful in
addressing perceptions of issue conflicts among arbitrators. The ICSID provi-
sions could also be amended to make it clear that the expanded disclosure re-
quirement would apply throughout the entire proceeding and not just at its
commencement.”).
45. CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Lim-
ited and Telcom Devas Mauritius Limited v. The Republic of India, PCA Case
No. 2013-09.
46. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005); Sempra Energy International v. Argen-
tine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28, 2007); Enron Cred-
itors Recovery Corp. and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007); U.N. International Law Commis-
sion [ILC], Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrong-
ful Acts, art. 25, [2001] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMMISSION 31, U.N. Doc. A/56/83.
47. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annul-
ment of the Argentine Republic (Sept. 25, 2007); Sempra Energy International
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine
Republic’s Application for Annulment of the Award (June 29, 2010); Enron
Creditors Recovery Corp. and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the
Argentine Republic (July 30, 2010).
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indicated that he continued to hold and publicly defend his
strong views on the proper interpretation of essential security
interests provisions. By contrast, the other noted the annulment
decisions that came after his prior decisions on the issue, affirm-
ing that he maintained an open mind. He was not disqualified.
48
When asked for their observations on challenges to them based
on issue conflict, arbitrators with clear track records of decisions
on the issue in question tend to make two points: first, that they
have a right to their own opinions³the freedom of speech point;
and second, that consistency in the application of legal principles
is a virtue, not a ground for disqualification. Both observations
have superficial appeal. While an arbitrator, like everyone else,
has an absolute right to his or her own opinions, that is not the
question; the question is whether he or she can sit in the case at
hand having prejudged an issue on which the case turns. Simi-
larly, the argument of consistency in the application of the law
misses the point, which is that the arbitrator has already deter-
mined how he or she will rule on the issue. Whatever the virtues
of consistency may be in other contexts, in the context of a chal-
lenge for lack of impartiality, a determination to be consistent is
an indication that the requisite impartiality is lacking.
III. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF TRIBUNALS
The foregoing is a prelude to the key issue of the sovereignty
of individual tribunals. The problems associated with the for-
mation of tribunals and the standards for arbitrator conduct are
severe enough, but combined with the fact that there is no clear
and uniformmechanism for review of awards in accordance with
a uniform body of law, they lead to a system that is progressively
losing credibility among the actors that created it.
It is true that investor-state arbitration has some of the trap-
pings of a legal system. After all, lawyers and tribunals alike are
still citing legal principles and decisional authority in their vo-
luminous briefs and decisions. Indeed, unlike in national court
systems, briefs in international arbitration are out of control,
48. CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Lim-
ited, and Telecom Devas Mauritius Limited v. The Republic of India, PCA Case
No. 2013-09, Decision on the Respondent’s Challenge to the Hon. Marc Lalonde
as Presiding Arbitrator and Prof. Francisco Orrego Vicuña as Co-Arbitrator
(Sept. 30, 2013).
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often reaching several hundred pages in length.
49
Much space is
devoted in those hundreds of pages to a discussion of precedents.
Yet, notwithstanding the fact that many arbitrators are sensi-
tive to the perception of legal chaos and unfairness created by
conflicting decisions andmake an effort to ground their decisions
in precedent, others staunchly defend the principle of arbitrator
sovereignty. Cynics argue that arbitrators ground their deci-
sions in precedents where the precedents conform to their views,
and have no hesitation in departing from precedents with which
they disagree. Of course, whether an arbitrator is making new
law is another issue that becomes cloudier with each passing
year, which brings new and sometimes incomprehensible deci-
sions resulting either from arbitrators pushing the envelope on
investor protection or from compromises among members of the
tribunals.
Compromise is inherent in ISDS. What else can be expected
from tribunals where two of the three members are appointed by
the parties? The tendency to compromise is not merely a func-
tion of an arbitrator’s inclination to defend the position of the
appointing party. It also results from the fact that the party-ap-
pointed arbitrators often come from opposite schools of thought
or legal philosophy, a natural consequence of the parties’ exer-
cising due diligence in making their appointments. Thus, com-
promise may result from an arbitrator’s perception of his or her
role as a quasi-party representative or from the perceived neces-
sity to reconcile two genuinely held, conflicting positions.
50
49. Compare the normal length of a brief in an investor-state case with a
brief in a federal district court in the United States, which ordinarily would
not exceed 25 pages without leave of court.
50. The perception that unanimity is to be favored in order to enhance the
credibility of an award can be a key driver in the decision-making process, but
it also is a key driver in producing incomprehensible decisions. One of the
grounds for annulment of an ICSID award is that it is not possible “to follow
how the tribunal proceeded from Point A. to Point B.” Maritime International
Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Government of Guinea, ICSID Case No.
ARB/84/4, Decision on the Application by Guinea for Partial Annulment of the
Arbitral Award, ¶ 5.09 (Dec. 14, 1989); ICSID Convention, supra note 23, art.
52. That tends to happen when legal principles are compromised for the sake
of maintaining collegiality and achieving unanimity. It has been argued that
“annulment committees should not be quick to find contradiction when in fact
what is evident from the award is the compromise reached in an international
collegiate adjudicative body.” Alapli Elektrik B.V. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID
Case No. ARB/08/13, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 200 (July 10, 2014). See also
Gilbert Guillaume, Failure to State Reasons in ICSID Awards, in THE REVIEW
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Either way, the product of the kind of horse-trading it may take
to arrive at a decision can make it difficult to follow the reason-
ing of a decision, which makes it vulnerable to attack and lack-
ing in credibility as a precedent.
It is not the point of this article to catalogue all conflicting de-
cisions in investor-state arbitration. There are many, and they
are well-known to members of the international arbitration com-
munity. Perhaps the best-known examples are the infamous
CME and Lauder cases, which reached diametrically opposed
conclusions within a short period of time in separate arbitrations
brought by a corporation and its indirect majority shareholder
based on the same facts.
51
The cases are widely considered an
embarrassment to ISDS.
52
More recently, the tribunals in Mo-
bil v. Venezuela and ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela reached con-
flicting results in cases arising out of the same nationalization.
53
OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 271, 283 (E. Gaillard ed., 2010) (“The
same is true where one of the parties alleges that an award is based on contra-
dictory reasons. It is indeed correct to say that truly contradictory reasons can-
cel each other out and that they are a sign that the award is insufficiently
motivated, which in turn should lead to the annulment of the award. However,
¶tribunals must often struggle to balance conflicting considerations and an ad
hoc Committee should be careful not to discern contradiction when what is ac-
tually expressed in a tribunal’s reasons could more truly be said to be but a
reflection of such conflicting considerations.’”). That kind of justification for in-
comprehensible awards does not enhance the credibility of ISDS.
51. Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award
(Sept. 3, 2001); CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL,
Partial Award (Sept. 13, 2001).
52. August Reinisch, The Proliferation of International Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms: The Threat of Fragmentation vs. the Promise of a More Effective
System? Some Reflections From the Perspective of Investment Arbitration, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND FRAGMENTATION 107, 116 (I.
Buffard et al. eds., 2008) (“The ultimate fiasco in investment arbitration oc-
curred in the Lauder/CME arbitrations against the Czech Republic.”); August
Reinisch, The Issues Raised by Parallel Proceedings and Possible Solutions, in
THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 113, 117 (M. Waibel et al.
eds., 2010); CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES ¶ 4.179
(2nd ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2017); Zachary Douglas, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS ¶ 576 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009); Susan D. Franck,
The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public In-
ternational Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521,
1568 (2005); Chester Brown, The Relevance of the Doctrine of Abuse of Process
in International Adjudication, 8 TRANSNAT’LDISP. MGMT. 3 (May 2011).
53. Venezuela Holdings, B.V. et al. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27; ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips
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In one case, Mobil, the tribunal formed under the BIT between
the Netherlands and Venezuela unanimously found that the na-
tionalization was lawful; in the other, a majority of the tribunal,
formed under the same treaty, found that Venezuela had
breached an obligation to negotiate compensation in good faith.
54
For present purposes, it is not relevant to delve into the legal
analysis of which decision was correct. Thematerial point is that
the decisions that were rendered on virtually identical facts are
irreconcilable.
The unfortunate reality for states is that on every important
issue arising in investor-state arbitration, breaking new ground
means expanding the scope of investor protection. This can be
seen in the movement to interpret FET clauses as protecting an
investor’s “legitimate expectations,” a concept used by some cre-
ative tribunals to fit fact patterns that most treaty negotiators
would find standard examples of legitimate state regulation ra-
ther than treaty violations.
55
That is only the most commonly
discussed example. Similar remarks can be made about other
standard treaty clauses, especially expropriation, full protection
and security, MFN and “umbrella” clauses.
56
What is more
Hamaca B.V. and ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30. The author was lead counsel for re-
spondent in both cases.
54. The third arbitrator in the ConocoPhillips case, Professor Georges Abi-
Saab, resigned for health reasons after rendering two strong dissenting opin-
ions, one on the merits and one on the majority’s decision denying an applica-
tion for reconsideration. ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips
Hamaca B.V and ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on Respondent’s Request for
Reconsideration, Dissenting Opinion of Georges Abi-Saab (Mar. 10, 2014);
ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V and ConocoPhil-
lips Gulf of Paria B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/30, Decision on Jurisdiction and the Merits, Dissenting Opinion of
Georges Abi-Saab (Feb. 19, 2015).
55. As noted earlier, such interpretations by NAFTA tribunals do not coin-
cide with the intentions of any of the three NAFTA states. See NAFTA Free
Trade Commission, supra note 12.
56. See Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, OSGOODE
HALL L. SCH. (Aug. 31, 2010), https://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement-
international-investment-regime-31-august-2010/ (“Awards issued by interna-
tional arbitrators against states have in numerous cases incorporated overly
expansive interpretations of language in investment treaties. . . . This is espe-
cially evident in the approach adopted by many arbitration tribunals to invest-
ment treaty concepts of corporate nationality, expropriation, most-favoured-
nation treatment, non-discrimination, and fair and equitable treatment, all of
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difficult to find is a ground-breaking case expanding the scope of
sovereign rights and restricting the scope of investor protection
in a manner that may credibly be said to be beyond the contem-
plation of the contracting states in entering into their treaties.
Thus, while states hope for decisions that do not depart from
their understanding of their own treaties, investors have little
fear of a more restrictive view of investor protection and look
with optimism at the prospect of an even better outcome with an
investor-friendly tribunal, which then is presented as authorita-
tive by other investors in other cases.
The problem is exacerbated by the absence of an effective ap-
pellate mechanism for the review of awards. The legal infra-
structure of enforcement is designed precisely to prevent ap-
peals, sacrificing the proper dispensing of justice in the interests
of finality. For non-ICSID awards, the successful party has
available to it conventions, such as the New York Convention,
which admits only narrow defenses to recognition and enforce-
ment.
57
For ICSID awards, the ICSID Convention provides for
an annulment procedure, again with narrow grounds for annul-
ment.
58
Although there have been important decisions granting
annulment,
59
there are also decisions refusing to annul an award
that lacked adequate motivation and contained manifest errors
of law having a decisive impact on the outcome of the case. The
classic example is the CMS annulment proceeding following an
award against Argentina, where the committee was highly crit-
ical of the original award, but refused to annul because of its
view of the “narrow and limited mandate conferred by Article 52
of the ICSID Convention.”
60
Argentina no doubt appreciated the
which have been given unduly pro-investor interpretations at the expense of
states, their governments, and those on whose behalf they act.”).
57. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards art. 5, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
58. ICSID Convention, supra note 23, art. 52 (improper constitution of the
tribunal, manifest excess of powers, corruption on the part of a member of the
tribunal, serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure, or failure to
state the reasons on which the award is based).
59. See, e.g., Venezuela Holdings, B.V. et al. v. Bolivarian Republic of Ven-
ezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Annulment (Mar. 9, 2017); Oc-
cidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production
Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Decision on
Annulment of the Award (Nov. 2, 2015).
60. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annul-
ment of the Argentine Republic, ¶ 158 (Sept. 25, 2007). The annulment
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criticism of the award, but presumably would have preferred a
simple annulment.
IV. QUANTUM
Pushing the envelope is not a practice limited to the traditional
legal questions arising under BITs; it has migrated into the
quantum phase of investor-state arbitrations. Quantum is the
new battleground in ISDS precisely because it is an area where
claimants feel they can put their creativity to best use, given the
technical nature of much of the quantum analysis and arbitra-
tors’ understandable lack of familiarity with the subject matter.
It should come as no surprise that claimants in any legal sys-
tem tend to begin their cases with exaggerated claims of com-
pensation, whether it be a personal injury claim of millions of
dollars for a coffee spill or a multibillion-dollar expropriation
claim. The technique is known as “anchoring.”
61
The exagger-
ated claim is made in the hope that a less exaggerated, but still
indefensible amount will seem reasonable by comparison. In a
mature legal system with professional judges, there are checks
and balances to curb abuse, but in the world of ISDS, the risk of
abuse is much higher. That is especially true in cases requiring
complex valuations of businesses, often involving natural
committee’s criticisms included the following: “[t]he motivation of the Award
on this point is inadequate”; “[o]n that point, the Tribunal made a manifest
error of law”; “[i]n doing so the Tribunal made another error of law”; “[t]hese
two errors made by the Tribunal could have had a decisive impact on the oper-
ative part of the Award”; and “[t]hroughout its consideration of the Award, the
Committee has identified a series of errors and defects.” Id. at ¶¶ 125, 130,
132, 135, 158.
61. Lucy Reed, The 2013 Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre
Kaplan Lecture ² Arbitral Decision-Making: Art, Science or Sport?, 30 J. INT’L
ARB. 85, 89²90 (2013) (“Arbitrators regularly have to make decisions on the
quantum of damages, which is a ripe area for a cognitive bias called ¶anchor-
ing.’ As Professor Christopher Drahozal of the University of Kansas Law
School explains: ¶[i]n estimating a numerical amount, people tend to start with
some initial value ² an “anchor” ² and then come up with a final estimate by
making adjustments to the anchor. If the anchor provides useful information
about the underlying value (such as the list price), and if people make reason-
able adjustments, this “anchor and adjustment” heuristic can be a useful [de-
cision-making] approach. But anchoring can be problematic if people start with
an irrelevant anchor or fail to make adjustments to the initial value.’ . . . A
lesson for us? Counsel must think carefully about the numbers used in esti-
mating damages in initial requests for arbitration.”).
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resources, which are typically at issue in investor-state arbitra-
tion.
62
Years ago, few of the actors in ISDS paid much attention to
quantum. That is not surprising considering that the actors are
almost exclusively lawyers untrained in economics and business.
Many lawyers avoid economic and technical issues like the
plague because those issues take them out of their comfort zone.
They prefer to concentrate on the legal issues relating to juris-
diction and the merits, happily ceding the technical terrain of
quantum to the experts.
In the corporate world, this ostrich approach places the lawyer
at a distinct disadvantage in negotiating the business terms of a
transaction. Referring economic and technical issues exclusively
to the experts runs the risk of key points falling between the
cracks and depriving the lead negotiator of the tools he or she
needs to gauge the relative importance of the terms under nego-
tiation. There is no point in drafting a perfect clause on a point
of minuscule economic significance, particularly when the focus
on that clause distracts attention from the main items affecting
value.
Likewise, a lawyer’s ignorance of the technical aspects of quan-
tum in a litigation or arbitration can prove costly to the client.
In some cases, such as those involving direct expropriation,
there is no dispute as to the obligation to compensate. Assuming
that no jurisdictional issues exist, the entire case revolves
around quantum. That includes some legal issues, such as de-
termination of the appropriate valuation date, but it also in-
volves technical and economic issues with which lawyers and ar-
bitrators feel less comfortable. Failure of lawyers to master those
issues, or at least converse intelligently in quantum, results in
weak cross-examinations of experts and weak presentations to
the tribunal, as well as the even more serious error of focusing
62. The gap between claimants’ and respondents’ valuations tends to be es-
pecially large in natural resource cases, particularly those involving oil. InMo-
bil v. Venezuela, for example, the claim according to the claimants’ theory of
the case exceeded $20 billion USD. The respondent’s analysis yielded a small
fraction of that amount. The tribunal awarded approximately US$1.6 billion
for the two projects at issue, plus interest, or less than 10 percent of the claim.
Venezuela Holdings, B.V. et al. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/27, Award (Oct. 9, 2014). Subsequently, an annulment panel
annulled the bulk of the original award, US$1.4 billion out of the original
US$1.6 billion. Venezuela Holdings, B.V. et al. v. Bolivarian Republic of Vene-
zuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Annulment (Mar. 9, 2017).
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on points of relatively low value and leaving high-value points
unaddressed; failure of arbitrators to do so runs the risk of mak-
ing monumental economic mistakes.
63
Given the other problems
inherent in ISDS, states are too often the ones paying the price
for such mistakes.
Other than pure questions of law, the most important quan-
tum issues recurring in investor-state cases concern the applica-
tion of the discounted cash flow (DCF) methodology to value an
interest. The object of the DCF methodology is to ascertain the
market value of an interest by estimating the future cash flows
it is expected to generate and then applying a discount rate to
arrive at the net present value of the interest as of the valuation
date. The first step in the analysis is obviously projecting net
cash flows for the life of the interest being valued, which requires
a projection of each of the inputs into those cash flows³operat-
ing costs, capital expenditures, taxes, production, sales and
prices³not an easy exercise when the period in question is
twenty years or even longer, as in some cases. Actual experience
and common sense say that even the best of long-term projec-
tions will be wrong, the only question being by how much. Under
such circumstances, the battle is over the assumptions concern-
ing each of the inputs into the cash flows, any one of which can
have a profound impact on value. The potential for abuse is enor-
mous. Presumably, the committee developing the World Bank
Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment had
that in mind when it warned that “particular caution should be
observed in applying this method as experience shows that in-
vestors tend to greatly exaggerate their claims of compensation
for lost future profits.”
64
One of the principal reasons for the proliferation of billion-dol-
lar damage claims in investor-state cases is the ingenuity of
claimants in imbuing surrealistic DCF calculations with the ap-
pearance of a sound theoretical foundation. In many cases, this
involves breaking new ground by convincing tribunals to apply
the DCF methodology even in the absence of a track record of
63. In non-bifurcated cases, the parties and the tribunals often have to ex-
plore both the legal and the quantum issues in the same hearing, with only a
few hours available for complex technical and economic issues that could easily
be the subject of weeks of hearings themselves.
64. World Bank Group [WBG], Legal Framework for the Treatment of For-
eign Investment, Volume II: Report to the Development Committee and Guide-
lines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment 26 (1992).
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profitability of the business or interest being valued, something
that the World Bank Guidelines consider inappropriate.
65
But
arbitrators at least are accustomed to dealing with that kind of
DCF issue.
66
What is more problematic, and what arbitrators
tend to be less comfortable with, is the determination of the ap-
propriate discount rate where there is no disagreement on the
use of DCF.
A basic calculation illustrates the importance of the discount
rate. An undiscounted cash flow of $20 million USD, generated
at the rate of one million per year over a twenty-year period, has
a present value of $4.87 million USD when discounted at an an-
nual rate of 20 percent, but when discounted at the rate of 10
percent, the present value is $8.51 million USD³almost double.
That is a scary thought when what is at stake is a billion dollar-
plus claim.
Once again, one need not search far and wide for an example
that shows that this is not an academic point. In Gold Reserve v.
Venezuela,
67
a popular case with claimants in investor-state ar-
bitration, the tribunal applied a 10.09 percent discount rate in
valuing a gold mining interest in Venezuela. The result was an
award of approximately $713 million USD. The key factor in the
tribunal’s decision on discount rate was its approach to the issue
of country risk, the element of discount rate analysis that takes
into account the reality that the location of an investment has a
direct effect on value.
68
The Gold Reserve tribunal applied a
65. Id. at 42.
66. See, e.g., Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v. The Arab Re-
public of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award (June 1, 2009); Metalclad
Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1,
Award (Aug. 30, 2000); Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v.
Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Award on the Merits (May
20, 1992).
67. Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/09/1, Award (Sept. 22, 2014).
68. Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. PT (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik
Negara, UNCITRAL, Final Award, (May 4, 1999), in 25 Y.B. COM. ARB. 13
(2000) (discussing “the fundamental issue of country risk, obvious to the least
sophisticated businessman,” and stating: “The fact remains that it is riskier to
enter into a 30-year venture in Indonesia than in more mature economies. And
it is no answer to say that the contract has allocated 99% of the risk to the
Indonesian side. After all, there are documents which by their terms allot 100%
of the risk to the debtor: bonds. Although they may be denominated in
US dollars, although they may stipulate absolute obligations to pay, it still
makes a difference whether the issuer is Switzerland or Swaziland.”).
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country risk premium of only 4 percent in arriving at its discount
rate, accepting the approach of the claimant’s economic expert
in that case. The same economic expert appeared for the claim-
ants in Tidewater v. Venezuela,
69
making the same basic argu-
ments on country risk, this time unsuccessfully, as the tribunal
applied a country risk premium³for the same country³of 14.75
percent, arriving at a discount rate of approximately 26 percent.
Had the 26 percent discount rate been applied to value the in-
terest in Gold Reserve instead of 10.09 percent, the result would
have been a fraction of the 713 million USD awarded, a differ-
ence of hundreds of millions of dollars. Once again, the decisions
are irreconcilable.
V. THE PATH FORWARD
What can be done? That is not an easy question, to say the
least.
There are several impediments to any serious attempt to ad-
dress the problem of ISDS, starting with the fact that not every-
one thinks there is a problem. As mentioned earlier, non-govern-
mental conferences on ISDS tend to resemble rallies for the sys-
tem. To the extent that reform is on the agenda, the issues tend
to be how to speed up the process, how to minimize review of
awards, how to expand the substantive protections of investors,
and how to persuade tribunals to accept approaches to quantum
that make extraordinary damage awards commonplace. There is
no point in arguing the demerits of ISDS in that environment.
That is not to say that there is no serious thinking going on
about the deficiencies of ISDS. The European Commission de-
serves much credit for focusing on the weaknesses of the system
and pushing for reform.
70
Thoughtful analyses have been made
and proposals advanced by prominent participants in ISDS,
71
69. Tidewater Investment SRL and Tidewater Caribe, C.A. v. Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, Award (Mar. 13, 2015).
70. See supra note 9.
71. See, e.g., Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potestà, Can the Mau-
ritius Convention Serve as a Model for the Reform of Investor-State Arbitration
in Connection with the Introduction of a Permanent Investment Tribunal or an
Appeal Mechanism?, GENEVA CENTER INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 15 (June 3,
2016); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potestà, The Composition of a
Multilateral Investment Court and of an Appeal Mechanism for Investment
Awards, GENEVACENTER INT’LDISP. SETTLEMENT (Nov. 15, 2017). Not all mem-
bers of the arbitration community are on board with the reform movement.
See, e.g., Brower & Blanchard, supra note 11; Charles N. Brower, Michael
44 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:1
and now we have UNCITRAL, in a radical departure from its
past activities, taking up the politically charged question of
ISDS with the following broad mandate: “The Working Group
would proceed to: (i) first, identify and consider concerns regard-
ing ISDS; (ii) second, consider whether reform was desirable in
light of any identified concerns; and (iii) third, if the Working
Group were to conclude that reform was desirable, develop any
relevant solutions to be recommended to the Commission.”
72
But
it is one thing to consider adjustments to the UNCITRAL Rules
falling within the category of tweaking, and quite another to ad-
dress a subject as controversial as the need to overhaul ISDS.
Indeed, much of the recent meeting of delegates in Vienna was
spent arguing about who would chair the working group.
73
That
was a sure sign of deep division between those looking for radical
reform and those willing to consider tweaks to the system with-
out altering its basic character.
It may be premature to forecast the failure of these efforts. Af-
ter all, they are just getting underway, and there are strong
forces pushing for reform. But the odds are against success for
many reasons, starting with the practical reality that the odds
are never in favor of reaching a satisfactory result in a group so
large, with interests so disparate.
74
Some reform³or change la-
beled as reform³may come, but in all likelihood only after years
of negotiation and consensus-building. In the meantime, the ex-
isting system, which poses a clear and present danger to states
and the public interest, will continue to operate and deteriorate.
Most of the proposals for reform revolve around the incorpora-
tion of an appellate mechanism in ISDS or the creation of an
Pulos & Charles B. Rosenberg, So Is There Anything Really Wrong with Inter-
national Arbitration As We Know It?, in CONTEMP. ISSUES INT’L ARB. &
MEDIATION: FORDHAM PAPERS 3 (A. W. Rovine ed., Brill 2013).
72. UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Set-
tlement Reform) on the Work of Its Thirty-Fourth Session (Vienna, 27 Novem-
ber²1 December 2017), ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/930 (Dec. 19, 2017) [hereinafter
Report of Working Group III].
73. See Anthea Roberts, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reform: Not Business as
Usual, EJIL: TALK! (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-
reform-not-business-as-usual/; Alison Ross, UNCITRAL Celebrates 55th After
Tense Talks on ISDS Reform, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Dec. 11, 2017).
74. In the past, when states were of one mind with lawyers, arbitrators and
investors in promoting ISDS, the chances of reaching consensus on changes
were not as slim. Now that states are not seeing their interests as aligned with
the other actors in the system, agreement on major change will not come easily.
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international investment tribunal. Those proposals do address a
number of ISDS deficiencies discussed herein, but the issues re-
quiring consensus before implementation could begin are legion,
running the gamut from the formation and composition of the
appeals boards or permanent tribunals to the scope of their au-
thority and the impact of their decisions. There is no need to cat-
alogue here those daunting issues, which are well-known to ex-
perts in the field. Suffice it to say that each one of them will gen-
erate countless hours of debate and countless conflicting opin-
ions that will somehow have to be reconciled, and that is after
consensus is reached on the concept of an appellate mechanism
or an international investment tribunal, which does not exist to-
day even within the reform community.
More importantly, one has to question whether the outcome of
this reform process, even if “successful,” would be worth the in-
vestment of time and effort necessary to achieve it. Assuming
that agreement can be reached among all the stakeholders on an
appellate mechanism or an international investment tribunal, it
cannot simply be presumed that the result would be an improve-
ment over today’s ISDS.
75
It is entirely possible that the law of
unintended consequences would strike yet again and that states
would find that they had constructed a new and even more dan-
gerous system on top of the old, like building a new floor on a
75. The term “stakeholders” is used to refer to the broad community in-
volved in ISDS, not just states. That in and of itself is good reason for states to
beware of any reform. States were encouraged to send government officials to
participate in UNCITRAL’s Working Group III, but private practitioners were
still involved. UNCITRAL, Annotated Provisional Agenda, ¶ 10,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.141 (Sept. 15, 2017) (“In line with the
UNCITRAL process, Working Group III would, in discharging that mandate,
ensure that the deliberations, while benefiting from the widest possible
breadth of available expertise from all stakeholders, would be government-led
with high-level input from all governments, consensus-based and be fully
transparent.”). A definition of “stakeholder” is “one who is involved in or af-
fected by a course of action.” Stakeholder, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stakeholder (last visited Oct. 17,
2018). That definition encompasses investors or investor groups and states, but
some would say arbitral institutions, arbitrators, lawyers, non-governmental
organizations, international organizations, third-party funders and others are
included as well. See Pieter H. F. Bekker, Recalibrating the Investment Treaty
Arbitration System Through Non-Compartmentalized Legal Thinking, 55
HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 1, 3²4 (Dec. 2013). It is fair to say that many of those
stakeholders are not looking for the same kind of reform as states that are
disillusioned with ISDS, and they are joined by a number of states that are
still more interested in preserving ISDS than reforming it.
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house with a shaky foundation. If that possibility becomes real-
ity, states will again be clamoring for a do-over within a few
years after the “successful” reform sets in. Reformists would
therefore be well advised to heed the old warning: “Be careful
what you wish for.”
These observations are not meant to discourage discussion of
reform. It is always good to shine a light on the problem³the
brighter the better³as long as the focus is clear and success is
not defined as the achievement of an even more robust ISDS,
incorporating and institutionalizing the principal vices that are
confounding and threatening states. The concern is that too
much effort will be invested in debating and designing mecha-
nisms that will either never come into being or be of dubious
value, or even harmful, if they do, the inevitable result of com-
promise between diametrically opposed views. States need to
recognize that the reform movement, with its focus on appellate
mechanisms and standing international tribunals to the exclu-
sion of the substantive principles to be applied, is not a panacea
for ISDS, and that putting all their eggs in the reform basket
may turn out to be a recipe for disaster.
76
76. See Improving Investment Dispute Settlement, supra note 22, at 3 (“Re-
form of investment dispute settlement cannot be viewed in isolation; it needs
to be synchronized with reform of the substantive investment protection rules
embodied in IIAs. Without a comprehensive package that addresses both the
substantive content of IIAs and ISDS, any reform attempt risks achieving only
piecemeal change and potentially creating new forms of fragmentation and un-
certainty.”). The reform proposals under discussion in UNCITRAL Working
Group III make clear that they do not address the substantive body of law that
has been developing through the flawed ISDS system. As the December 19,
2017 Report of the recent session of the Working Group in Vienna states: “It
was also recalled that ISDS provided a method to enforce the substantive obli-
gations of States. It was noted that critical questions on possible ISDS reform
involved the underlying substantive rules. Nonetheless, it was clarified that
the mandate given to the Working Group focused on the procedural aspects of
dispute settlement rather than on the substantive provisions.” Report of Work-
ing Group III, supra note 72, ¶ 20. The thinking behind this approach seems
to be that experience shows that attempts to reach agreement on substantive
issues are doomed to failure. That may be true if the effort is all-encompassing
both in terms of the range of issues addressed and the states involved, but it
should not be true with respect to individual issues, individual states and in-
dividual treaties, where progress would be both useful and feasible. In any
event, an inability to restore order on the substance should not be an excuse
for designing legal infrastructure that runs the risk of institutionalizing legal
principles that have no legitimate foundation.
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As noted earlier, the question now is whether ISDS is too bro-
ken to be fixed. If so, a conclusion more and more states are
reaching, then the focus should be on dismantling the system,
not reforming it.
77
That is not an easy task, as the system is built
to last. The thousands of investment treaties that are the back-
bone of the system are long-term in nature, and even when they
are terminated, they have long tails, covering existing invest-
ments for years after termination, which is one of the main
stumbling blocks to reform of the system.
Nevertheless, at some point states will have to decide whether
to take matters into their own hands and at least attempt to
undo the system they created. A good start would be to put a
freeze on any new investment treaties (or investment chapters
in trade agreements). The existing web of treaties is bad enough.
Why make matters worse with new treaties? Unless and until
the fundamental deficiencies of ISDS can be addressed satisfac-
torily and a credible system of dispute settlement emerges, in-
vestment treaties will continue to be weapons of legal destruc-
tion that should be the subject of anti-proliferation policies. To
borrow an expression associated with Nancy Reagan, states
should “Just Say No” when it comes to new investment treaties.
In the exceptional case where a compelling argument can be
made for entering into a new treaty, care should be taken to
clearly circumscribe the protections offered and avoid language
that can easily be distorted. Most importantly, MFN clauses
should be avoided, as they can be misused to transform carefully
negotiated provisions into unintended, sweeping protections.
The expression that best fits MFN clauses is “high risk, low [or
no] reward.”
Once the bleeding is stopped, attention should be turned to the
small matter of the three thousand-plus existing treaties. There
a multipronged approach is in order. First, it would be advisable
for states to explore the possibility of reaching agreements with
their counterparties on termination, together with an
77. Dismantling ISDS does not mean erasing principles of international re-
sponsibility of states. It simply means that investors would not have direct ac-
cess to international arbitration to assert international law claims. The prac-
tice of espousal of claims would remain, and other alternatives, including state-
to-state arbitration, could be pursued. At some point, starting with a clean
slate based on a well-defined set of legal principles, a new ISDS might emerge,
with all the checks and balances of a credible legal system, but it is doubtful
that such a system can be built upon the foundation of the current ISDS.
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amendment to their treaties’ sunset provisions.
78
Second, where
treaties cannot be terminated by mutual agreement, or states
feel that there actually are perceptible benefits from particular
treaties making them worthy of preservation, consideration
should be given to opening discussions with the counterparties
to discern the possibility of eliminating or modifying especially
troublesome provisions or reaching agreement on interpreta-
tions to guide the tribunals applying them.
79
TheNAFTA parties
paved the way for that approach with their interpretation of
NAFTA’s FET provisions.
80
More recently, other countries have
78. Whether existing treaties can be amended to alter or cut off protections
for existing investments is an interesting legal question. Some may argue that
investors are third-party beneficiaries whose rights cannot be taken away even
if the contracting states purport to do so, but there are stronger arguments in
favor of the view that the parties to a treaty may exercise their right to amend
the treaty in any way they see fit, either in accordance with the treaty’s amend-
ment provisions or under the law of treaties embodied in the Vienna Conven-
tion. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 37, 39, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] (Article 37: Revocation or Modification
of Obligations or Rights of Third States; Article 39: General Rule Regarding
the Amendment of Treaties). See Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Ex-
tent and Limits of Investment Treaty Rights, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353 (2015);
Tanya Voon, Andrew Mitchell & James Munro, Parting Ways: The Impact of
Mutual Termination of Investment Treaties on Investor Rights, 29 ICSID REV.
451 (2014).
79. See VCLT, supra note 78, art. 31, ¶ 3 (Article 31: General Rule of Inter-
pretation, ¶ 3 states “There shall be taken into account, together with the con-
text: (a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the inter-
pretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions . . . .”).
80. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, supra note 12. FET is only the most
obvious of the issues on which onemight expect broad agreement among states.
MFN is another, as it should not be too difficult to reach agreement on elimi-
nating the concept or at least clarifying that it should not be used to import
standards of treatment from other treaties, much less consents to arbitration.
The entire concept of MFN is unsuitable for investment treaties, just as it is
unsuitable for any private contract. Aside from substantive legal principles,
other important issues that could be tackled individually include the standards
to be applied for arbitrator challenges and the role of third-party funders in
ISDS. As discussed earlier, the lax standards of conflicts for arbitrators damages
the credibility of ISDS, and the proliferation of cases financed by third-party fun-
ders has transformed ISDS into a marketplace for a new type of investment that
was not the object of protection under investment treaties. Finally, bearing in
mind the danger of abuse in connection with quantum in investor-state arbi-
tration, it would be worth addressing some of the recurring quantum issues
that have become the object of much creativity in recent years, including dis-
count rate and interest rate.
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taken that path.
81
An intermediate step would be to publish uni-
lateral interpretations setting forth the state’s understanding of
individual provisions of its BITs.
82
Finally, if agreement cannot
be reached on termination, modification or interpretation, states
should examine their treaties to determine their expiration
dates, renewal provisions, automatic or not, and whether there
are any provisions for early termination, with a view toward tak-
ing the necessary steps to ensure termination at the earliest op-
portunity.
On a broader scale, one can envision opening a multilateral
convention not just for procedural issues, but to clarify and de-
clare what states think the law is or should be on basic points.
Success in this approach is less likely than in the less ambitious
approach of addressing substantive issues bilaterally, but each
success on the smaller scale is helpful in attaining the objective
on the broader scale, particularly if the temptation to strive for
consensus on all issues at once is resisted and the focus is placed
on the most problematic individual issues, one at a time.
81. Jarrod Hepburn, Unable to Unilaterally Terminate a 2011 BIT, the Gov-
ernment of India Persuades Counter-Party to Agree Joint Interpretive Note to
Clarify BIT’s Implications, INV. ARB. REP. (July 17, 2017); Douglas Thomson,
India’s BIT Recast Continues, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (July 19, 2017). For this pur-
pose, it would be helpful if the treaty itself contained a provision declaring in-
terpretations by the contracting parties to be binding. See U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT, art. 30, ¶ 3 (“A joint decision of the Parties,
each acting through its representative designated for purposes of this Article,
declaring their interpretation of a provision of this Treaty shall be binding on
a tribunal, and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must be consistent
with that joint decision.”). Even if it does not, such interpretations can be ef-
fective. SeeQuestion of Jaworzina (Polish-Czechoslovakian Frontier), Advisory
Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 8, at 37 (Dec. 6, 1923) (“[I]t is an established
principle that the right of giving an authoritative interpretation of a legal rule
belongs solely to the person or body who has power to modify or suppress it.”).
UNCITRALWorking Group III or any other large and unwieldy group may not
be the ideal forum to achieve agreement on the proper interpretation of basic
substantive concepts recurring in investment treaties; one-on-one discussions
may be a more fruitful avenue. It is also not a good idea to hold up conclusions
on individual issues pending agreement on all issues. Progress on individual
issues is of value and can spur progress on others.
82. See Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, Investment
Division, Office Memorandum: Issuance of Joint Interpretative Statements for
Indian Bilateral Investment Treaties, F. No. 26/07/2013-IC (Feb. 8, 2016) (In-
dia), available at http://indiainbusiness.nic.in/newdesign/upload/Consoli-
dated_Interpretive-Statement.pdf.
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CONCLUSION
In sum, it is high time for states to take action on many fronts.
First and foremost, they will have to decide once and for all
whether to celebrate the system they created, to reform it, or to
consider it an egregious error and tear it down. The first option
is no longer in vogue. The second is unlikely to prove fruitful.
The third, which may be the most difficult, is increasingly
viewed by states as the most appealing, and with good reason.
